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Negotiating agents
Shall I accept?
Shall I continue? 
What is my next bid?
Can I trust him?
How will he respond 
to my bid?
Agent-Based Market Protocol negotiation architecture:
[Jonker and Treur, 1999] 
Based on comparing utility of bids and parameters for decision rules.
In this case the utility function is a linear combination of economic value, 
quality preference, and risk evaluation:
U = wVV + wQQ + wRR
Decision rule parameters:
- concession factor γ:
how far is the agent willing to go in making concessions?
- negotiation speed β:
the extent of concessions the agent typically makes per negotiation round
- acceptable utility gap size ω:
at what utility difference does the agent accept a partner’s bid?
- impatience factor ι:
inclination to break-off if partner’s bids are too far away from the expected 
 
 
 
Culture Conditions wQ wR γ β ω ι 
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Trading Updating beliefs
[new_info_available]
[beliefs_up_to_date]
Prepar-
ing bid
Waiting 
for reply
Evaluat-
ing bid
[success]
[failed]
[bid_sent]
[tired_of_waiting]
[counterbid_received]
[accepted_by_partner]
[unrealistic_bid]
[too_little_progress]
[accepted]
Confirm-
ing
[acceptable_bid]
[make_counterbid]
[partner_selected]
Prepar-
ing coun-
terbid
[counterbid_sent]
Selecting 
partner Nego-
tiating
[partner_selected]
[failed]
Delivering
[success&sell]
[product_delivered]
Accepting 
delivery
[success&buy]
[delivery_trusted]
[trace_requested] Requesting 
trace
[delivery_distrusted]
 
Dimensions of national cultures [Hofstede, 2001]
• Power distance
– Egalitarian versus hierarchical societies
• Uncertainty avoidance
– Uncertainty tolerant versus U. avoiding societies
• Individualism versus collectivism
– Refers to individual identity and responsibility
• Masculinity versus femininity
– Performance vs. cooperation oriented societies
• Long- versus short-term orientation
– Perseverance versus immediate gratification
 
 
 
            Example of simulation results: 
            Percentage of negotiations that fail 
Customer culture Supplier 
culture USA China Russia India 
USA 49 57 69 43 
China 45 17 70 41 
Russia 61 47 51 41 
India 41 41 66 32 
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1 Introduction 
Anybody with experience in international trade knows that bargaining practices differ across the 
world. Models to describe bargaining, are not valid across the world unless culture is taken into account. 
‘Culture’ is a notion with many meanings, some of which are contested in some disciplines. However, the 
leading paradigm today is widely accepted and used in both practice and academia. According to it, 
culture refers to the unwritten rules of society. An agent-based model of bargaining in which the agents 
are cultured offers several promises. It can help understand the dynamics of international negotiations in 
trade. It could also serve as a training tool for aspiring international traders.  
This paper describes an agent-based model for bargaining in the context of trade. The agents follow 
common sense strategies such as maximizing gain, seeking good quality, and minimizing risk. But they 
also have models of how to behave in an appropriate manner, such as: is it allowable to refuse a 
negotiation proposal; may an agent quit if it no longer likes the negotiation; must a serious concession be 
shown in each bid; is cheating allowed if the partner is not paying attention? These models are based on 
Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture (see [2] for an explanation of these dimensions).  
For the agents’ negotiation strategy we chose the ABMP architecture of Jonker and Treur [3]. It is 
based on comparing the utility of bids. The present paper applies the utility function proposed by 
Tykhonov et al. [4]. It covers the relevant aspects mentioned above (business value, quality and risk): 
U(b,a,p) = wP,apP(b,a,p) + wQ,apQ(b,a) + wR,apR(b,a,p) (1) 
U(b,a,p) stands for the utility that agent a expects from bid b made by agent p. P(b,a,p) reflects a’s belief 
about the economic value of the transaction. It is calculated as the profit expected from the transaction in 
case of cooperation, minus the estimated risk of the transaction. Q(b,a) reflects the subjective valuation of 
the quality attribute of the proposed transaction, in addition to the market value, e.g. a trader may prefer 
trading biologically grown food, even if more profit may be made with traditionally grown. R(b,a,p) 
reflects a’s subjective, risk-averse valuation (in addition to the “rational” risk evaluation included in P). 
The ABMP strategy has a number of parameters, with which the behavior of the agent can be tuned. 
With respect to the influence of culture, the relevant ABMP parameters are: 
- concession factor (how far is the agent is willing to go in making concessions?), 
- negotiation speed (the extent of concessions the agent typically makes per negotiation round), 
- acceptable utility gap size (at what utility difference does the agent accept a partner’s bid?), and  
- impatience factor (the inclination to break-off if the partner’s bids are too far away from the expected).  
[1] explains how Hofstede’s culture dimensions influence the weight factors in the utility function and  
the relevant ABMP parameters (increase or decrease according to scores on Hofstede’s dimensions whish 
are given as agent parameters). Furthermore, [1] proposes formal models for the implementation of 
culturally differentiated ABMP negotiation in agents. 
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 2 Simulation Results 
Negotiations are performed in a multi-agent simulation. Eight agents are assigned the role of supplier,  
eight agents the role of customer. Agents may select a partner and negotiate purchasing of a commodity 
that has either high or basic quality. However, quality is not visible, so the buyer of a high quality product 
has to accept risk, i.e. trust the seller. In the current simulation, agents have no information about 
partner’s trustworthiness. If they agree on high quality, they implicitly accept the risk of deceit. 
Transactions may fail if concession factors cannot bridge the acceptable utility gap, or if impatient agents 
find progress too slow. Macro level observables of the simulation are number of successful transactions, 
failed negotiations, average duration of negotiations, average quality of transactions, etcetera. 
The correct implementation of Hofstede’s model is verified in simulations with agents from imaginary 
cultures that differ on only one of the dimensions. Tables 1 and 2 present example results of more 
realistic, complex cultures. A high number of successful transactions (table 1) indicates a rapid flow of 
trade. Failure of negotiations (table 2) is one of the possible causes that slow trade down. The examples 
illustrate that the culture parameters have their effect in the multi-agent simulations. They differentiate 
aggregate performance in mono-cultural settings as well as intercultural interactions in a believable way.  
Table 1. Number of successful transactions per 
run in 16 simulation runs of equal length, each
run with different cultural settings 
Table 2. Percentage of negotiations that failed 
per run in 16 simulation runs of equal length, 
each run with different cultural settings 
customer culture  customer culture supplier 
culture USA China Russia India   
supplier 
culture USA China Russia India  
USA 61 45 37 69  USA 49 57 69 43 
China 65 90 37 53  China 45 17 70 41 
Russia 49 56 59 63  Russia 61 47 51 41 
India 58 61 39 69  India 41 41 66 32 
3 Conclusion 
Culturally differentiated negotiating agents are useful in a context where human factors play a role. Social 
simulation is an example of such a context. Other application areas may be training and education, and 
decision support systems for human negotiations. Cultural differentiation of behavior is less relevant in 
situations where the purpose of negotiating agents is to outperform people by rational decision making. 
This paper contributes to the understanding of culture’s influence on decision making in business by 
exploring the feasibility of Hofstede’s five-dimensional model to simulate believable agents in business. 
Preliminary results of the simulation of complex, reality-based cultures give evidence that culture in 
agents can be simulated plausibly by applying Hofstede’s model. However, more validation is required 
(on the basis of culture and negotiation literature and experiments) and remains for future research. 
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